Appetitive and Aversive Goal Values Are Encoded in the Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex at the Time of Decision Making by Plassmann, Hilke et al.
Behavioral/Systems/Cognitive
Appetitive and Aversive Goal Values Are Encoded in the
Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex at the Time of Decision Making
Hilke Plassmann,1,2 John P. O’Doherty,3,4,5 and Antonio Rangel3,4
1Institut Europe´en d’Administration des Affaires, 77305 Fontainebleau, France, 2Inserm, Ecole Normale Superieure, 75005 Paris, France, 3Humanities and
Social Sciences and 4Computational and Neural Systems, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125, and 5Institute of Neuroscience,
Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland
An essential feature of choice is the assignment of goal values (GVs) to the different options under consideration at the time of decision
making. This computation is done when choosing among appetitive and aversive items. Several groups have studied the location of GV
computations for appetitive stimuli, but the problem of valuation in aversive contexts at the time of decision making has been ignored.
Thus, although dissociations between appetitive and aversive components of value signals have been shown in other domains such as
anticipatory and outcome values, it is not known whether appetitive and aversive GVs are computed in similar brain regions or in
separate ones. We investigated this question using two different functional magnetic resonance imaging studies while human subjects
placed real bids in an economic auction for the right to eat/avoid eating liked/disliked foods.We found that activity in a common area of
the medial orbitofrontal cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex correlated with both appetitive and aversive GVs. These findings
suggest that these regions might form part of a common network.
Introduction
A sizable fraction of human and animal decisions involves value-
based choice (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Daw et al., 2005;
Rangel et al., 2008). In this type of choice, individuals begin the
decision process by first assigning values to all of the stimuli that
can be obtained, and then comparing the computed values to
select one of them. The values assigned to the different stimuli at
the time of decision making are often called “goal values.”
An important open question is whether different types of
choice situations engage different valuation networks. For exam-
ple, individuals sometimes have to choose between multiple ap-
petitive items, as epitomized by the decision of a hungry diner
facing a well stocked buffet table. But at other times they need to
choose between multiple aversive items, for example, when
choosing which of two undesirable risks to take. In this paper, we
investigate whether goal values in these two cases are computed
in the same regions or whether, in contrast, distinct neural sub-
strates are at work.
Thereareconsiderablebehavioral andneurobiological reasons to
take seriously the hypothesis that there might be two goal valuation
systems, one for appetitive decisions andone for aversive ones. First,
evidence for the existence of neuroanatomically distinct appetitive
and aversive responses has been found in the representationof other
decision-related signals such as “outcomevalues,” “anticipatory val-
ues,” and “prediction errors” (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Rolls et al.,
2003; Small et al., 2003; Seymour et al., 2005;Ursu andCarter, 2005;
Yacubian et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2007; Elliott et al., 2010). Second,
a large body of evidence in behavioral economics suggests that
valuation functions in the appetitive domain (gains) have differ-
ent properties from those in the aversive domain (losses) (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979). In particular, in the case of monetary
choices, it has been shown that individuals weight losses more
strongly than gains of a similarmagnitude. A natural explanation
for such an asymmetry is the existence of a separate valuation
system for gains and losses.
There are also reasons to consider the possibility that appeti-
tive and aversive goal values might be encoded in overlapping
areas. Although several monkey electrophysiology (Wallis and
Miller, 2003; Padoa-Schioppa andAssad, 2006) and human func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies (Arana et al.,
2003; Paulus and Frank, 2003; Plassmann et al., 2007; Chib et al.,
2009; Hare et al., 2008, 2010) have found activity in medial or-
bitofrontal cortex (mOFC) associatedwith appetitive goal values,
Tom et al. (2007) found a decrease in activity in medial OFC
while subject evaluated gambles involving monetary loss. How-
ever, because in that study the “aversive” outcomes were given by a
reduction in the overall monetary payoff from participating in the
experiment, the prospect of monetary loss might not have activated
the aversive system. Thus, the means by which aversive goals are
evaluated in the brain at the time of decision making has not been
fully addressed. In this paper, we report the results of two fMRI
studies in which subjectsmade choices to avoid eating aversive food
outcomes to provide additional insight into this question.
Materials andMethods
The first study looked for areas thatmight encode aversive goal values. In
particular, we scanned sated subjects’ brains using fMRI while they re-
peatedly placed real bids for the right to avoid eating different disliked
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foods (e.g., baby foods, canned meat) in a
Becker–DeGroot–Marshak (BDM) auction
(Becker et al., 1964) (Fig. 1). A key feature of
the design was that the bids entered by subjects
generated reliable real-time measures of the
aversive goal values assigned to every item: the
higher the bid, the more aversive the item. We
could then use the bids to look for brain areas
that parametrically correlated with aversive
goal values. Another important feature of the
design was the presence of two kinds of trials:
free-bid trials and forced-bid trials. These two
trial types were identical except that, whereas
subjects were free to select the amount of their
bid in the free trials, they were required to bid a
certain amount in the forced trials. As explained
in more detail below, this allowed us to separate
areas that encode for goal values from areas that
encode for other correlated but different compu-
tations (e.g., anticipatory disgust).
The second study investigated whether the
same overlapping areas ofmOFCanddorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) are involved in
appetitive and aversive goal value computa-
tions. We performed a follow-up study during
which subjects made choices involving appeti-
tive and aversive items on separate trials. In
particular, subjects now could enter positive
bids to indicate that the items were appetitive,
and if so how much, and negative bids to indi-
cate that the items were aversive, and if so howmuch. All other details of
the experiment remained unchanged. In addition to providing an inde-
pendent replication test of the first study and of Plassmann et al. (2007),
a key feature of this second study was that it allowed us to compare
directly between neural representations of aversive and appetitive goal
values within the same sample of subjects, rather than just performing
such comparisons in a qualitative manner between different subject
groups and across studies. Note that goal values refer to the value as-
signed to stimuli at the time of choice, in some choice paradigms involv-
ing learning, they are also called “Q values.”
Study 1
Subjects. Nineteen normal-weight subjects participated in the experi-
ment (15 males; mean age, 23.7; age range, 18–47). One additional sub-
ject participated in the experiment but was excluded from the analysis
because of technical problems during data acquisition. All subjects were
right-handed, were healthy, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
had no history of psychiatric diagnoses, neurological or metabolic ill-
nesses, and were not taking medications that interfere with the perfor-
mance of fMRI. All subjects had no history of eating disorders and were
screened for disliking the types of foods used in the experiment (subjects
who had allergies or other medical reasons not to consume some of the
foods were excluded from the experiment). Also, subjects who partici-
pated in the study by Plassmann et al. (2007) were not eligible to partic-
ipate in this study.
Stimuli. Subjects bid on 50 different sweet and salty foods that, during
pretesting, were rated as either neutral or aversive by our subject popu-
lation. Examples of the foods used include various types of baby foods
and canned meats. We selected the foods based on pilot data to satisfy
several characteristics. First, we wanted items that were available at local
supermarkets. Second,wewanted items to be aversive for our subjects (in
the sense that they were willing to pay to avoid having to eat the items at
the end of the experiment). The behavioral data show that subjects indeed
disliked the foods: the average willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid having to
eat the items was $1.75 (SE, 0.17), and the bids were negatively correlated
with ratings of howmuch subjects would enjoy eating the foods collected at
the end of the experiment (r0.77; p 0.0001) (see Fig. 2c).
The foods were presented to the subjects using high-resolution color
pictures. The stimulus presentation and response recording was con-
trolled by E-prime (Psychology Software Tools). The visual stimuli were
presented using video goggles.
Task. Figure 1 describes the time structure of the experiment. Subjects
were instructed to eat at most 2 h before the experiment to decrease the
attractiveness of the foods. During the informed consent period, subjects
agreed to eat whatever food item they would eventually have to eat as
determined by the auction mechanism described below. Note that, al-
though none of the subjects failed to comply with this instruction, they
had the right towithdraw from the study at any point, in accordancewith
standard human subject protections.
Subjects were instructed that they would have to remain in the labo-
ratory for 30 min at the conclusion of the experiment and that they will
have to eat whatever food was shown on a randomly selected trial unless
they purchased from us the right not to do so. In addition to a $50/h
participation fee, each subject received three $1 bills in “spending
money” to place bids to purchase the right to avoid eating disliked food
items. Whatever money they did not spend was theirs to keep.
Subjects placed bids for the right to avoid eating particular foods in 100
different bidding trials. In each trial, they were allowed to bid $0, $1, $2,
or $3. At the end of the experiment, one of those trials was randomly
selected, by drawing a ball from an urn, and only the outcome of that trial
was implemented. As a result, subjects did not have to worry about
spreading their $3 budget over the different items and they could treat
each trial as if it were the only decision that counted. Objects were sold
using amodified version of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auction. The
rules of the auction were as follows. Let b denote the bid made by the
subject for a particular item. After the bid is made, a random number n
was drawn fromaknowndistribution (in our case, $0, $1, $2, and $3were
chosen with equal probability). If b  n, the subject did not have to eat
the item and paid a price equal to n. In contrast, if b n, the subject had
to eat the entire portion of the food shown but also did not have to pay
anything. The only reason allowed for not eating the food if the auction
was lost were medical allergies. No subject refused to eat the food in the
experiment. Subjects were aware of these instructions from the begin-
ning of the experiment (instructions are included in the supplemental
material, available at www.jneurosci.org).
We used this auction because it has three very useful properties. First,
it is characterized by a simple set of rules. Second, the optimal strategy for
a buyer is to bid exactly her WTP for avoiding the food item being sold.
Figure 1. Study 1: experimental design. a, Timeline of the experiment. b, Time course for free- and forced-bid trials. Free- and
forced-bid trialswere identical except that, in forced-bid trials, subjects choose howmuch to bid ($0, $1, $2, or $3) for the right not
to have to eat the food item, and in forced-bid trials theywere forced to bid the amount shownwith the food stimulus. Food items,
trial type, and forced-bid amountswere fully randomizedwithin subjects. The design for study 2 is very similar except that subjects
are shownboth appetitive and aversive items and choose a bid in the range3 to 3 to indicate theirwillingness to pay to consume
the item (which is negative for aversive items).
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The intuition for why this is the case is as follows. There is no incentive to
bid less than the WTP since the price paid is determined by the random
number n, and thus the bids do not affect the price paid. There is also no
incentive to increase the bid above the WTP since this may lead to a
situation in which the subject avoids having to eat the item but ends up
paying a price larger than his WTP (e.g., consider the case of WTP $1,
b $3, andn $2). The fact that bidding theWTP is the optimal strategy
was explained and emphasized extensively during the instruction and
training period. We performed extensive pilot work to find a set of in-
structions that lead to 100% reported compliance with the best strategy.
The instructions emphasized that the subject’s best strategy is to look at
the item, ask herself howmuch avoiding to eat the foodwas worth to her,
and simply bid that amount. Third, andmost importantly, since bidding
the exactWTP is the best strategy, the bids provide a goodmeasure of the
aversive goal value computed by the brain for every subject and item at
the time of decision making. Thus, we could use the bids as a behavioral
measure of aversive goal value to correlate with the blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) signal on a trial-by-trial basis.
It is important to highlight several limitations of this procedure for
measuring the values. First, to keep the task simple in the scanner, sub-
jects were only allowed to bid discrete amounts ($0, $1, $2, or $3). A
consequence of this is that the bids were only approximations of the true
WTP computed by subjects. For example, when the trueWTP is $2.3, our
measure is $2. Similarly, subjects with aWTP larger than $3 enter a bid of
$3. However, the data suggest that the approximation is a good one (see
Fig. 2c). Second, theoretical work (Karni and Safra, 1987; Horowitz,
2006) has shown that bidding theWTP is a dominant strategy only when
individuals have expected-utility like preferences, and that otherwise the
optimal bid depends on the underlying distribution prices used by the
BDM procedure, an effect that has been shown in experimental work
(Bohm et al., 1997). This raises the possibility that there might have been
an additional source of noise in our measurement of the values. How-
ever, the theoretical work shows that the bids preserve the monotonicity
of the underlying values even under nonexpected utility preferences.
We used two different kinds of trials: free-bid trials and forced-bid
trials. Each of the 50 items was shown twice, once in a free trial and once
in a forced trial. The order of these trials was fully randomized across
subjects and food items. Both types of trials had equal probability of
being selected to be the trial that was implemented at the end of the
experiment. The timing for each type of trial is shown in Figure 1b.
Subjects were required to enter a bid within the 4 s bidding window.
Trials in which subjects failed to do so were classified as missing trials in
the analysis described below.
A key difference between the two types of trials is that, whereas
subjects were free to select the amount of their bid in the free trials,
they were told how much to bid in the forced trials. The forced bids
were drawn uniformly and independently from $0, $1, $2, $3 on each
trial. The set of rules described above applied to both trials. As a result,
subjects need tomake an aversive goal value computation in free trials to
decide how much to bid, but they do not necessarily need to do so in
forced trials.
The existence of both types of bidding trials is an essential component
of the experimental design. Adifficulty in searching for the neural basis of
the aversive goal value computation is that, when the brain is exposed to
a picture of an aversive food item, itmight simultaneously compute other
variables that are correlated with goal value. For example, the brain may
simulate the anticipated taste of the food, whichmay lead to a calculation
of the level of disgust. If this issue is not properly addressed, one could
erroneously attribute goal value computations to areas that are calculat-
ing different, albeit correlated, variables. The presence of free and forced
trials provides a potential solution to the problem: the subject needs to
perform a goal value computation in the free trials, since she needs to
decide howmuch to bid, but not in the forced trials, since she is told what
her bid should be. As a result, any area that encodes for goal values in free,
but not in forced trials, is a good candidate for the goal value computa-
tion. In contrast, areas whose activity correlates with goal values in both
types of trials might be encoding goal values or different, but correlated,
computations. Fortunately, all of the key areas of interest identified in
both studies have the property that they are correlated with goal values in
free but not in forced trials, so this potential false negative is not an issue.
One caveat to this procedure is that subjects might engage in more reli-
able anticipatory computations of goal value in free than in forced trials,
since they know that they have more control over their bids. This fact,
together with the imposition of randomly selected bids in the forced
trials, could partially contribute to the difference in correlation with the
value signals in free and forced trials.
After receiving the instructions (included in the supplemental mate-
rial, available at www.jneurosci.org), subjects were trained on the use of
the response boxes with their right hand and on the bidding procedure.
To avoid activation artifacts attributable to the assignment of buttons to
bid amounts, the assignment was counterbalanced across subjects.
After the scanning session, subjects performed a liking-rating task.
Subjects were asked to rate “howmuch would you like to eat this food at
the end of the experiment” for each of the items. We used a scale from 1
(not at all) to 5 (very much). Each food picture was shown in random
order and subjects had an unlimited amount of time to enter their rating.
fMRI data acquisition. The functional imaging was conducted using a
Siemens 3.0 tesla Trio MRI scanner to acquire gradient echo T2*-
weighted echo-planar (EPI) images with BOLD contrast. To optimize
functional sensitivity in OFC, we used a tilted acquisition in an oblique
orientation of 30° to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure
line. In addition, we used an eight channel phased array coil, which yields
a 40% signal increase in signal in the medial OFC over a standard head
coil. Each volume comprised 32 axial slices. A total of 1100 volumes (two
sessions; 18 min each) were collected during the experiment in an
interleaved-ascending manner. The imaging parameters were as follows:
echo time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 mm; in-plane resolution and slice
thickness, 3 mm; repetition time, 2 s; no interslice gap. Whole-brain
high-resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1  1  1 mm) were
acquired from the 19 subjects and coregistered with their mean EPI
images and averaged together to permit anatomical localization of the
functional activations at the group level. Image analysis was performed
using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute
of Neurology, London, UK). Temporal normalization was applied to the
scans with an acquisition time of 1.9375 referenced to the last volume. To
correct for subject motion, the images were realigned to the last volume,
spatially normalized to a standard T2* template with a resampled voxel size
of 3mm, and spatially smoothed using aGaussian kernel with a full width at
half-maximum of 8 mm. Intensity normalization and high-pass temporal
filtering (using a filter width of 128 s) were also applied to the data.
fMRI data analysis. Two different, albeit closely related, general linear
models were used in the paper. The twomodels are described in detail in
the supplemental material (available at www.jneurosci.org). Here, we
briefly sketch the characteristics of the main model used to generate the
results described in the paper.
The data analysis proceeded in three steps. First, we estimated a general
linear model with AR(1) and the following regressors that capture the
main events in our experiment: R1, free bid at picture presentation; R2,
free bid at response; R3, forced bid at picture presentation; R4, forced bid
at response; R5,missed bid trial and picture presentation; and R6,missed
bid trial at response. The regressors that capture the presentation of the
food pictures were modeled using 4 s events. The regressors for the bid
responses were modeled as events with a duration equal to the response
time of the subject (measured from the appearance of the bid screen).
The regressors for the missed bid trials were modeled as 4 s events. To
take advantage of the parametric nature of our design, we included two
modulators: the first regressor was modulated by the magnitude of the
free bid and the third regressor was modulated by the bid that the item
shown in that trial received in the free condition. These modulators were
constructed subject-by-subject. Note that the free bid is a measure of the
subject’s aversive goal value for the item being shown. We also included
a constant term and sixmotion parameters as regressors of no interest for
each session. Each of the regressors was convolved with a canonical he-
modynamic response function.
Second, we calculated the following first-level single-subject contrasts:
(1) free-bid trials while exposed to itemmodulated by free bid (regressor
R2), (2) forced-bid trials while exposed to itemmodulated by its respec-
tive free bid (regressor R4), and (3) regressors R2 minus R4.
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Third, we computed group random-effect estimates using the whole-
brainandregion-of-interest (ROI) techniques.For thewhole-brainanalyses,
we calculated random-effects group estimates contrasts using one-sample t
tests over the single-subject contrast statistics. For inference purposes, we
used a threshold of p 0.001, uncorrected, and an extent threshold of 5
voxels. For expositional purposes only, all of the activation maps in the
paper are drawn at the more liberal threshold of p 0.005, uncorrected,
and an extent threshold of 5 voxels. The ROI analyses were based on a
priori hypotheses about five areas that have been previously shown to be
involved in different aspects of valuation in related contexts: bilateral
medial orbitofrontal cortex, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, bilateral
insula, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and ventral striatum. The ROI anal-
ysis was performed by carrying out one-sample t tests over the single-
subject contrasts statistics using an statistical threshold that was small
volume and false discovery rate corrected at the p  0.01 level. This
correction was implemented with the SPM software. (For additional
details, see supplemental material, available at www.jneurosci.org.)
Study 2
Since the experiment is very similar to study 1, we only describe the
differences between them.
Subjects. Twenty normal-weight subjects participated in the experi-
ment (15 males; mean age, 23–25; age range, 19–34). Two additional
subjects participated in the experiment but were excluded from the anal-
ysis because of technical problems during data acquisition. In addition to
all of the exclusion criteria listed above, subjects were screened for liking
and disliking the types of foods used in the experiment. None of the
subjects who participated in this experiment was part of study 1.
Stimuli. Subjects bid on 60 different sweet and salty foods. During
pretesting, 30 of those items were rated as aversive and 30 as appetitive or
neutral by our subject population. Examples of the aversive foods used
include various types of baby foods and canned meats. Examples of the
appetitive foods used include various types of candy bars and chips. We
selected the foods based on pilot data to satisfy several characteristics.
First, we wanted items that were available at local supermarkets. Second,
we wanted items to span a close-to-uniform distribution of appetitive
and aversive ratings.
Task. Subjects received the instructions to come neither full nor hun-
gry to the experiment. As before, subjects were instructed that theywould
have to remain in the laboratory for 30 min at the conclusion of the
experiment and that the food that they will have to eat would depend on
their bidding behavior on a randomly selected trial. Instead of placing
bids for the right not to have to eat a food, subjects now placed bids for
the right to eat or to avoid eating particular foods in 120 different bidding
trials. In each trial, theywere allowed to bid$3,$2,$1, $0, $1, $2, or
$3. Foods were sold using a modified version of the Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak auction as described above. Note that positive bids (i.e., a
willingness to pay) now indicated the value placed on consuming the
item and that negative bids indicated the amount of money that the
subject needs to be compensated to be willing to consume the item. Also,
the random number used to determine the outcome of the auction now
was randomly drawn from3 to3. The possibility of placing positive
and negative bids does not change the key property of the BDM auction
procedure: subjects’ best strategy still is to bid the amount (in dollars)
that they like or dislike the item. This implies that the bids were a good
approximation to the appetitive or aversive goal value computed by the
brain in every trial.
Each of the 60 items was shown twice, once in a free-bid trial and once
in a forced trial.
fMRI data acquisition. Data acquisition of study 2 was identical with
that of study 1 except that a total of 1473 volumes (three sessions; 12
min each) was collected in an interleaved-ascending manner.
fMRI data analysis. The analysis proceeded exactly as in study 1. How-
ever, note one key difference between the two studies. In experiment 1,
subjects bid for the right not to have to eat the item. As a result, higher
bids mean more aversive goal values. In contrast, in experiment 2, sub-
jects bid for the right to have to eat the item (if positive) or for the amount
of compensation that they require to be willing to eat the item (if nega-




Figure 2a shows the distribution of bids during free- and forced-
bid trials. The average bid in free trials was $1.75 (SE, 0.17), which
was not significantly different from the average bid on the forced
trials, and75% of the free bids were greater than zero. The bid
amounts for the forced-bid trials were randomly drawn from a
uniform distribution on $0, $1, $2, and $3.
Figure 2b shows the distribution of bid reaction times for free-
and forced-bid trials by bid amount. Two-sided paired t tests
showed significant differences between the free versus forced tri-
als for $1 bids, but not for the other amounts. The same test also
showed a significant difference in reaction times between $1 and
$2 free-bid trials and $0 and $3 free-bid trials, perhaps reflecting
a difference in difficulty between extreme and nonextreme aver-
sive goal values.
To verify that the bids in the free-bid trials were good mea-
sures of the aversive goal values, we also sampled liking ratings for
each food after the scanning session (scale: 1, not at all, to 5,
neutral). Figure 2c shows that the free bids correlated negatively
with subjects’ reported liking for the foods (r  0.77; p 
0.0001). These findings suggest that the subjects’ bids reflect their
disliking for the foods and that subjects understood the bidding
procedure described in Materials and Methods.
Imaging results
We estimated a general linear model to test for brain regions in
which BOLD activity was correlated (positively or negatively)
with the aversive goal values, as measured by the individual sub-
ject bids, during the evaluation period at the beginning of each
trial (for details, see Materials and Methods and supplemental
material, available atwww.jneurosci.org). Thismodelwas used to
identify three key contrasts of interest: (1) areas correlated with
aversive goal values during the free-bid trials, (2) areas correlated
with aversive goal values during the forced-bid trials, and (3)
areas that exhibited a stronger correlationwith goal values during
the free-bid trials than during the forced-bid trials. As discussed
in Materials and Methods, the last contrast is essential because it
allows us to identify areas that are related to the computation of
goal values, as opposed to areas that are involved in computations
that are correlated with goal values but distinct from them (e.g.,
anticipatory disgust).
We performed two kinds of random-effects group analyses:
whole-brain analysis (at a statistical threshold of p  0.001, un-
corrected, and an extent threshold of 5 voxels) and ROI analyses.
These later analyses were based on a priori hypotheses about four
areas that have been previously shown to be involved in different
aspects of valuation in related contexts: the bilateral mOFC, the
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC), the right lateral
OFC (lOFC), the ventral striatum (VtStr), and the bilateral in-
sula. These areas were selected as candidate regions for an aver-
sive goal valuation system based on findings from the previous
literature in behavioral neuroscience. All ROI statistics were
small-volume false-discovery rate corrected (SVFDRC) at the
p 0.01 level. In the results below (as well as in the supplemental
tables, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material),
we report the results of both types of analyses.
We selected these five ROIs for the following reasons. First, we
included themOFC and the rDLPFC in our set of ROIs because a
previous study by the authors, which used a similar design in an
appetitive context (Plassmann et al., 2007), found that BOLD
activity in these two areas was correlated with appetitive goal
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values. Second, we included the right lOFC in our set of ROIs
because previous studies of valuation at the time of outcome have
found that BOLD activity in this area correlates with different
types of aversive outcomes in certain contexts (O’Doherty et al.,
2001; Anderson et al., 2003; Gottfried et al., 2003; Rolls et al.,
2003; Elliott et al., 2008). Third, we included the ventral striatum
because several studies have found activity in this area that cor-
related with behavioral measures of goal values (Kable and Glim-
cher, 2007; Knutson et al., 2007; Tom et al., 2007). However, note
that previous work (Hare et al., 2008) has shown that BOLD
activity in this area is involved in the encoding of prediction
errors, but not of goal values at the time of decision making.
Finally, we included the insula because previous studies have
shown that BOLD activity in this area correlates with several
aspects of disgust (Sanfey et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003), the
experience of negative emotions (e.g., fear), and converging evi-
dence implicates this region in appetitive reactions to food (Bal-
leine and Dickinson, 1998; Jabbi et al., 2007).
Correlation with aversive goal values in
free trials. Supplemental Table 1 (available
at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material) lists the results of this contrast
for both types of analyses. Interestingly,
no brain areas showedpositive correlation
with aversive goal values at a threshold of
p 0.001, uncorrected, with a 5 voxel ex-
tent threshold. However, the whole-brain
analyses identified several regions in
which the BOLD signal and the aversive
values were negatively correlated: the
middle and superior frontal gyrus, the an-
terior cingulate cortex, the superior tem-
poral gyrus, the posterior insula, the
mOFC, and the DLPFC. Not surprisingly,
given that the ROI analyses amounts to
using a lower statistical threshold on the
same contrasts, this analysis identified
correlations in the bilateral mOFC (Fig.
3a) (x  2, y  32, z  14, t  3.79,
pSVFDRC  0.01; x  3, y  32, z  17,
t  3.41, pSVFDRC  0.01), the right
DLPFC (Fig. 3b) (x 39, y 41, z 22,
t  3.66, pSVFDRC  0.01), and the bilat-
eral posterior insula (x  36, y  7,
z  7, t  3.38, pSVFDRC  0.01; x  42,
y10, z 4, t 3.73, pSVFDRC 0.01).
In contrast, activity in the lOFC and VtStr
was not significantly correlated with the size of the bids at this
same SVFDRC threshold.
Correlation with aversive goal values in forced-bid trials. As
shown in supplemental Table 2 (available at www.jneurosci.org
as supplemental material), the whole-brain analysis identified
only two regions with a (positive) significant correlation: the
brainstem and the middle temporal gyrus. Also, and in sharp
contrast to the free trials, the ROI analysis did not find either a
positive or negative significant correlation with aversive goal val-
ues during the forced-bid trials at a level of pSVFDRC 0.01.
Correlation with aversive goal values in free versus forced trials.
A limitation of the first contrast is that it identifies areas whose
activity is correlated with aversive goal values, but also identifies
areas that encode for variables that might be correlated with it,
such as anticipatory disgust, but that are not involved in the
computation of goal values. To address this potential confound,
we took advantage of our experimental design and tested for
regions that correlate with bids in free trials more than in forced
trials (see supplemental Table 3, available at www.jneurosci.org
as supplemental material). No brain areas showed more positive
correlation in free than forced trials with aversive goal values at a
threshold of p 0.001, uncorrected, and a 5 voxel extent thresh-
old. The whole-brain analyses identified several regions in which
the BOLD signal exhibited more negative correlation with the
bids in the free trials: the posterior cingulate cortex, the medial
frontal gyrus, the superior temporal gyrus, themidbrain, the fusi-
form and parahippocampal gyri, the posterior insula, themOFC,
and the DLPFC. The ROI analysis showed that mOFC (Fig. 4a)
(x 2, y 32, z23, t 3.12, pSVFDRC 0.01), rDLPFC (Fig.
4c) (x  45, y  41, z  25, t  3.30, pSVFDRC  0.01), and the
bilateral posterior insula (x  39, y  1, z  8, t  3.36,
pSVFDRC 0.01; x 42, y13, z 1, t 2.97, pSVFDRC 0.01)
exhibited the desired correlation. However, the contrast was not
significant in the lOFC or VtStr at a level of pSVFDRC 0.01.
Figure 2. Study 1: behavioral results. a, Distribution of bids in free and forced trials. b, Reaction times for free- and forced-bid
trials as a function of the size of the bid in that trial (bars denote SEs). c, Correlation and linear regression fit between liking ratings
(sampled after the scanning session) and free bids (sampled during scanning session). Each point denotes a food item averaged
across subjects.
Figure 3. Study 1: random-effects ROI analyses shows that activity in the bilateral medial
OFC (x2, y 32, z14, t 3.79; x 3, y 32, z17, t 3.41) (a) and the
bilateral DLPFC (x46, y 35, z 14, t 3.86; x 39, y 41, z 22, t 3.66) (b) are
negatively correlated with the bid in the free trials at the time of evaluation. The results are
overlaid on the mean anatomical image. The color scale represents the magnitude of t values.
For visualization purposes, we use a threshold of p 0.005, uncorrected, and a 5 voxel extent
threshold. SVFDRC statistics are reported in the text.
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Since the mOFC and the DLPFC have
been shown to correlate with appetitive
goal values (Plassmann et al., 2007), we
decided to explore further the computa-
tions made in these two areas using a post
hoc analysis.We extractedmeasures of the
average response in these two ROIs to
high ($2 and $3) and low ($0 and $1) free-
bid items during the evaluation period
(for details, see supplemental material,
available at www.jneurosci.org). Figure 4,
c and d, shows the resulting parameter es-
timates for both areas in free-bid trials. In
both cases, the activity in the free-bid tri-




Figure 5a shows the distribution of bids
during free- and forced-bid trials. The av-
erage bid in free trials was $0.21 (SE,
0.12), which was not significantly differ-
ent from the mean bid in the forced trials,
and75% of the free bids were smaller or
greater than zero. The bid amounts for the
forced-bid trials were randomly drawn
from a uniform distribution on $3,
$2,$1, $0, $1, $2, and $3. Two-sided paired t tests showed no
significant differences in reaction times between positive versus
negative free bids (meanpos, 909.55 ms; SEpos, 54.52 ms; meanneg,
905.81 ms; SEneg, 60.19 ms; T(19) 0.19; p 0.85).
To verify that the bids in the free-bid trials were good mea-
sures of the aversive and appetitive goal values, we also sampled
liking ratings for each food after the scanning session (scale: 1, not
at all, to 5, very much). Figure 5b shows that the free bids corre-
lated with subjects’ reported liking for the foods (r 0.930; p
0.0001). These findings suggest that the subjects’ bids reflected
their liking and disliking for the foods and that subjects under-
stood the bidding procedure described inMaterials andMethods.
Imaging results
The analysis proceeded as in study 1. However, note one key
difference between the two studies. In experiment 1, subjects bid
for the right not to have to eat the item. As a result, higher bids
representedmore aversive goal values. In contrast, in experiment
2, subjects bid for the right to eat the item (if positive), or for the
amount of compensation that they required to be willing to eat
the item (if negative). In this case, larger bids mean more appet-
itive goal values and lower bids mean more aversive goal values.
Correlation with goal values in free trials. Supplemental Table 4
(available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material) lists
the results of this contrast. The whole-brain analysis did not re-
veal any areas exhibiting a negative correlation with the goal val-
ues at a threshold of p 0.005, uncorrected, with a 5 voxel extent
threshold. However, this analysis identified several regions in
which the BOLD signal and the goal values were positively corre-
lated: the lingual gyri, the anterior cingulate, the superior frontal
gyrus, themOFC, and the DLPFC. The ROI analyses showed that
activity in the bilateral mOFC (x 4, y 30, z13, t 4.55,
pSVFDRC  0.01; x  3, y  31, z  12, t  4.55, pSVFDRC 
0.01) and the right DLPFC (x  49, y  30, z  27, t  2.88,
pSVFDRC  0.01) was correlated with the magnitude of the goal
Figure 4. Study 1: random-effects ROI analyses shows that activity in the bilateral medial OFC (x 2, y 32, z23,
t 3.12) (a) and the right DLPFC (x 45, y 41, z 25, t 3.30) (b) are more negatively correlated with free bids
during the free trials than during the forced trials at the time of evaluation. c, Estimates of the response inmedial OFC to the
stimulus screen for low free-bid ($0 –$1) versus high free-bid ($2–$3) trials show that activity decreased with the bid in
free-bid trials (paired t test, p 0.0027) but not in forced-bid trials. d, Similar parameter estimates in right DLPFC show
that activity decreased with themagnitude of the bid in free-bid trials ( p 0.00001) but not in forced-bid trials. Error bars
indicate SEM. **p 0.005; ***p 0.001.
Figure 5. Study 2: behavioral results. a, Distribution of bids in free and forced trials. b,
Correlation and linear regression fit between liking ratings (sampled after the scanning session)
and free bids (sampled during scanning session). Each point denotes a food item averaged
across subjects.
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values. But at this same SVFDR corrected threshold therewere no
significant correlations in the insula, the lOFC, or the VtStr.
Correlation with goal values in forced-bid trials. Supplemental
Table 5 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental mate-
rial) lists the results of this contrast. A whole-brain analysis
showed that activity changes in the cuneus and lingual gyrus were
positively correlated with goal values, and that activity in the
parahippocampal gyrus and the superior temporal gyrus was
negatively correlated with the same measure. Importantly, how-
ever, in none of our ROIs was activity significantly correlated
with goal values at a level of pSVFDRC 0.01.
Correlation with goal values in free versus forced trials. Supple-
mental Table 6 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material) describes the results of this contrast. A whole-brain
analysis showed that activity in the parahippocampal gyrus, infe-
rior temporal gyrus, mOFC, and DLPFC exhibited a larger posi-
tive correlation with goal values in free than in forced trials. The
associated ROI analysis confirmed the activations in mOFC (Fig.
6a) (x  6, y  30, z  12, t  3.48, pSVFDRC  0.01) and
DLPFC (Fig. 6a) (x  50, y  30, z  21, t  3.38, pSVFDRC 
0.01) but found no significant excess correlations in lOFC, the
insula, or the VtStr at the same significance level.
As before, since the mOFC and the DLPFC have been shown
to correlate with appetitive goal values (Plassmann et al., 2007)
and seemed also to be involved in aversive valuation in study 1,
we decided to explore further the computations made in these
two areas using a post hoc analysis. We extracted measures of the
average response in these two ROIs during the evaluation period
for positive (bid 0), neutral (bid 0), and negative (bid 0)
items. Figure 6, b and c, shows the resulting parameter estimates
for each of the two areas for free- and forced-bid trials. In all three
cases, the activity in the free-bid trials decreased with the magni-
tude of the free bid. Interestingly, activity in the mOFC and
DLPFC during free trials was negative for aversive items and
positive for positive items, which is consistent with the data from
Plassmann et al. (2007) and study 1.
Correlation with goal values in free appetitive trials versus free
aversive trials. The previous results show that, in study 2, activity
in mOFC and DLPFC correlated with goal values in both the
appetitive (non-negative bids) and aversive (negative bids) range.
A natural question is whether there are areas that exhibit a stron-
ger correlation with goal values in the positive or negative do-
mains, which would point to some degree of specialization in
appetitive or aversive goal value coding. To address this ques-
tion, we estimated an additional general linear model (for
details, see supplemental material, avail-
able at www.jneurosci.org) in which we
looked for areas that correlated with goal
values more strongly during the free trials
in either the non-negative or in the nega-
tive range. As reported in supplemental
Table 7 (available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material), the bilateral in-
sula, anterior cingulate cortex, andmedial
frontal gyrus exhibited stronger correla-
tionwith the bids during the non-negative
trials. No areas exhibited stronger correla-
tion with bids during the negative trials at
our omnibus threshold.
In addition, we also look for areas that
exhibited stronger excess correlation in
free trials than in forced trials for either
appetitive or aversive items. The results,
described in supplemental Table 10 (available at www.jneurosci.
org as supplementalmaterial), show that this excess correlation is
stronger in the insula for appetitive items, and in the inferior
frontal gyrus for aversive ones.
Conjunction analysis
We concluded the analysis by performing a conjunction anal-
ysis (for details, see supplemental material, available at www.
jneurosci.org) to identify regions in which brain activity was
positively correlatedwith appetitive goal values in free trials in the
study by Plassmann et al. (2007), negatively correlated with aver-
sive goal values in free trials in study 1, and positively correlated
with goal values (both aversive and appetitive) in free trials in
study 2. The results, depicted in Figure 7, reveal overlapping loci
of activation in the mOFC (x  3, y  36, z  18, t  4.43,
pSVFDRC 0.01) and the right DLPFC (x 42, y 42, z 15, t
4.29, pSVFDRC 0.01).
Discussion
Tomake sound decisions, the brain needs to encode a number of
distinct valuation signals (Rangel et al., 2008). First, at the time of
evaluation, it needs to assign a value to the different options
under consideration. These so-called goal value signals are used
to guide choices. Second, it needs to encode the value of the
outcome that it expects to receive following the selected option
(“anticipatory values”). Third, the brain needs to measure the
value of the actual outcome when it occurs (“outcome values”).
The outcome value, together with the anticipatory value mea-
sure, is then used to compute a prediction error thatmeasures the
deviation between actual and anticipated values. Prediction er-
rors serve as a teaching signal that can be used to improve future
value assignments at the time of decision making.
Importantly, all of these value signals can be either positive or
negative. For example, the outcome signals are positive for appet-
itive items that individuals like, and negative for aversive items
that they dislike. This gives rise to a basic question in the neuro-
biology of decision making: Is the same region used to encode
both valences of the different types of value signals, perhaps by
encoding appetitive values with increases of activity, and aversive
values with decreases of activity? Or, alternatively, are there dis-
sociable areas encoding appetitive and aversive values? This ques-
tion has received a considerable amount of attention in the case of
outcome values, prediction errors, and anticipatory values, but
not in the case of the computation of goal values at the time of
decision making. One exception is a study by Tom et al. (2007)
Figure6. Study2.a, Random-effects ROI analyses show that activity in the rightmedial OFC (red; x6, y30, z12, t
3.48) and the right DLPFC (blue; x 50, y 30, z 21, t 3.38) are negatively correlated with the bid in the free trials at the
time of evaluation. b, Estimates of the response inmedial OFC to the stimulus screen for negative free-bid ($3–$1), zero free
bids, and positive free-bid ($1–$3) trials in free-bid trials (green) show that activity increased with the bid, but not in forced-bid
trials (blue). c, Similar parameter estimates in right DLPFC show that activity decreased with the magnitude of the bid. Error bars
indicate SEM.
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that used fMRI to look for correlates of
value signals for choices between mone-
tary gambles. From the viewpoint of test-
ing for the existence of separate goal value
systems, a potential concern is that mon-
etary payoffs might not have been able to
engage a putative purely aversive valua-
tion region in the same way that a biolog-
ical punishment such as an unpleasant
food stimulus would. In contrast to the
study by Tom et al., in our studies subjects
had to eat disliked foods (a real biological
punisher) that provided us with a better
chance of activating the hypothesized
aversive valuation areas.
With respect to outcome valuation,
correlates of positive outcome values have
been found using fMRI in themedial OFC
for odor (Anderson and Sobel, 2003; Rolls
et al., 2003), flavor (Rolls et al., 2003;
Small et al., 2003; McClure et al., 2004),
attractive faces (O’Doherty et al., 2003b;
Cloutier et al., 2008), and even secondary
reinforcers such asmoney (Knutson et al.,
2001; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Ursu and
Carter, 2005; Liu et al., 2007; Elliott et al.,
2010). Analogous results have been found
for negative experiences: subjective re-
ports of pain intensity correlate with ac-
tivity in the insula and the anterior
cingulate cortex (Peyron et al., 1999), and
monetary losses, unattractiveness in face stimuli, and the presen-
tation of aversive odors have been found to elicit activity in the
lateral OFC (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Ursu andCarter, 2005; Liu et
al., 2007; Elliott et al., 2010). Not all of the evidence, however,
points in the direction of a dissociation between appetitive and
aversive outcome value signals (Breiter et al., 2001; O’Doherty et
al., 2003a; Dillon et al., 2008; Elliott et al., 2010). For instance,
Elliott et al. (2003) found in a block design that activity in medial
and lateral OFC was correlated with both wins and losses.
O’Doherty et al. (2003) found that lateral OFC was engaged after
detection of contingency changes after a monetary loss rather
than by a monetary loss per se.
Another key valuation signal is the prediction error that en-
codes the difference between expected and actual outcomes, and
that may play a role in the acquisition of value predictions. There
is much evidence to implicate the phasic activity of dopamine
neurons in encoding a prediction error signal during learning
with reward stimuli (Schultz, 1998), andmoreover human imag-
ing studies report reward-prediction error-related activity in
prominent target areas of these neurons in the striatum (Delgado
et al., 2000; Pagnoni et al., 2002; Elliott et al., 2003; Yacubian et al.,
2006; Seymour et al., 2007). The extent to which dopamine is also
involved in responding to aversive events has been controversial
(Horvitz, 2000). However, a recent neurophysiological investiga-
tion found evidence that some dopamine neurons responded to
both appetitive and aversive stimuli (Matsumoto and Hikosaka,
2009), suggesting that these neurons may potentially contribute
to the learning of aversive as well as appetitive associations.
Our results contribute to this literature by showing that a
complete appetitive–aversive spatial dissociation does not seem
to exist in the case of the goal valuation signal at the time of
decision making. Instead, we found that activity in the mOFC
and the DLPFC were negatively correlated with a trial-by-trial
measure of aversive goal values (study 1), that this locus intersects
in a conjunction analysis with regions that in a previous study
have been found to exhibit positive correlation with appetitive
goal values (Plassmann et al., 2007), and that these same areas
also correlated positively with overall goal values when subjects
need tomake decisions about both appetitive and aversive stimuli
(study 2). These results suggest that the mOFC and the right
DLPFCmight encode a goal value signal at the time of choice that
applies to both appetitive stimuli and aversive stimuli.
It is important to emphasize that our evidence suggests that
the mOFC and the DLPFC play a similar role in computing goal
values in appetitive and aversive situations. This does not imply,
however, that the exact same network is active in computing both
types of valuations. In particular, it does not preclude the likely
possibility that these two valuation areas receive differential in-
puts in the appetitive and aversive cases. In fact, our experimental
design also allowed looking for areas that might play a more
important role in the computation of appetitive or aversive goal
values. We found that activity in the insula correlated more
strongly with appetitive goal values than with aversive goal values
and that the opposite relationship might hold for the inferior
frontal gyrus.
An important question in behavioral neuroscience is whether
the goal value circuitry constantly engages in the evaluation of
stimuli, even when a choice is not possible, or if it only does so
when a choice opportunity is at hand. A recent fMRI study (Leb-
reton et al., 2009) addressed this question directly and found
appetitive goal value signals in the mOFC during both active and
passive evaluation situations. In contrast, we did not find signif-
icant value activity in this area during the forced trials (although
some marginal value coding was found in DLPFC) (Fig. 6). One
Figure 7. Comparison across studies. Results of a conjunction analysis to determine overlaps between areas that correlate
positively with appetitive goal values during free-bid trials in the study by Plassmann et al. (2007) correlate negatively with
aversive goal values during free-bid trials in study 1 and correlate positively with (appetitive and aversive) goal values during
free-bid trials in study 2. BOLD activity in the right medial OFC (x 3, y 36, z18, t 4.43) (a) and the right DLPFC (x
42, y 42, z 15, t 4.29) (b) correlate positively with appetitive goal values and negatively with aversive goal values in a
common valuation region.
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possibility is that the presence of the forced bids deactivates an
automatic valuation process that would have been present
otherwise.
Given the spatial limitation of fMRI, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the regions identified in this paper contain neu-
rons that encode separately for the goal value of appetitive and
aversive items. An extension of the experimental design of previ-
ous studies that have looked at single neuron responses to appet-
itive goal values (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008) to the case of
aversive items could be used to explore the extent to which dif-
ferent neural populations within OFC and DLPFC encode sepa-
rately the value of appetitive and aversive items.
With respect to mOFC, our conclusions regarding the exis-
tence of a common value region are supported by the literature
on the functional anatomy of the OFC, which has shown that this
area is uniquely placed as a “hub” that integrates a variety of
different inputs such as sensory information from all five senses
and visceral and somatosensory information (Carmichael and
Price, 1994, 1996). The mOFC also has heavy direct or indirect
interconnections with brain areas involved in anticipation, learn-
ing and experiencing rewards and punishments, such as the stri-
atum, insular cortex, amygdala, and lateral parts of the OFC,
whichmight also participate in the valuation process. The nature
of the inputs supplied by these and other connections is an im-
portant open question for future research. More generally, this
study contributes to the growing literature on the functions of
prefrontal cortex in decision making by showing that the valua-
tion functions of mOFC extend to both the appetitive and aver-
sive realms and thus the notion that this area might act as a
general stimulus valuator in the service of decision making.
The paper also contributes to our understanding of DLPFC
function. This area is known to carry out a variety of cognitive
functions including the top–downmodulation of posterior brain
regions (Miller, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001), maintenance of
information in working memory (Levy and Goldman-Rakic,
2000; Curtis and D’Esposito, 2004), and manipulation of infor-
mation inworkingmemory (Petrides, 2000). Several studies have
also shown that the activity of some parts of DLPFC is correlated
with various measures of value during perceptual and economic
decision-making tasks (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Wallis and
Miller, 2003; Seo et al., 2007). The results in this paper suggest
that DLPFC plays a role in the computation of goal values in both
appetitive and aversive domains, perhaps by supplying inputs to
OFC. Such a hypothesis is supported by anatomical studies in
primate brains that have shown that the OFC and the DLPFC are
heavily interconnected (Petrides and Pandya, 1999).
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